By – Mansi Khetan
Abstract
International law claims universal legitimacy yet remains structurally anchored in Western epistemological traditions, embedding colonial hierarchies within its foundational doctrines of sovereignty, positivism, and source hierarchy. Drawing on TWAIL scholarship, this article exposes how Indian philosophical traditions, centred on dharma, relational justice, and pluralism, offer substantive yet systematically marginalised alternatives to the dominant legal order. Mere inclusion of non-Western voices remains insufficient; what is required is epistemic redistribution, fundamentally reorienting whose knowledge constructs legal legitimacy. Without this deeper structural transformation, decolonisation risks becoming performative, leaving international law universal in claim but parochial in practice.
Introduction
International Law aims to speak the language of universality, but if you listen closely, the accent is unmistakably Western. The call to decolonise international law has gained remarkable traction in recent years, yet its outcomes remain strikingly limited. Despite increased representation and critical scholarship, the foundational architecture of international law continues to reflect Western epistemologies, privileging concepts such as sovereignty, individual rights, and positivist legality. This persistence is not merely a result of oversight or historical inertia. It reflects a deeper structural preference embedded within the discipline itself. As scholars like Antony Anghie argue, international law was historically shaped through colonial encounters, where legal doctrines evolved to legitimise imperial expansion rather than universal justice. Similarly, B.S. Chimni’s work demonstrates how global legal norms continue to reproduce hierarchies between the Global North and South.
Within this framework, Indian philosophical traditions, which are rich with concepts of dharma, pluralism, and relational ethics, do not merely sit at the margins, but are structurally sidelined. Their exclusion raises a deeper question: whose knowledge counts as legitimate in shaping global norms? This article argues that decolonising international law requires more than just inclusion; it demands a fundamental rethinking of its epistemic foundations. By examining structural bias, exploring alternative Indian frameworks, and critiquing current reform efforts, it seeks to show that legitimacy in global governance remains unevenly distributed.
Structural Bias: International Law’s Eurocentric Foundations
International law’s Eurocentrism is not incidental, but it is foundational. This discipline emerged alongside European colonial expansion, embedding concepts that reflected European political realities rather than universal principles. Sovereignty, for instance, was historically defined in ways that excluded non-European polities, treating them as “uncivilised” or lacking legal personality. This legacy persists today in doctrines governing state recognition, intervention, and development. Martti Koskenniemi highlights how international law oscillates between formal equality and substantive hierarchy, masking power asymmetries under the guise of neutrality.
TWAIL scholars have further exposed how international institutions perpetuate these hierarchies. Chimni argues that global governance structures, from the UN to the WTO, reflect “hegemonic international law,” where Western interests shape normative priorities. Sundhya Pahuja similarly demonstrates how development discourse operates as a continuation of colonial logic, framing non-Western societies as deficient and in need of reform. These critiques reveal that the marginalisation of Indian and other non-Western traditions is not a gap to be filled, but a system to be interrogated.
Moreover, the sources doctrine under Article 38 of the ICJ Statute privileges state practice and opinio juris, effectively sidelining philosophical and ethical traditions that do not fit within positivist frameworks. As Upendra Baxi notes, this narrow conception of law excludes “subaltern normative orders” that operate outside formal state structures. The result is a discipline that claims universality while remaining epistemically parochial.
Indian Legal Thought: An Alternative Normative Imagination
Indian philosophical traditions offer a fundamentally different way of conceptualising law and justice. Unlike the rights-centric framework of modern international law, Indian thought emphasises duties, relationships, and moral order. The concept of dharma, for instance, is not merely religious or cultural; it represents an ethical framework governing conduct, responsibility, and social harmony. This contrasts sharply with the individualistic orientation of Western legal systems. Scholars such as Amartya Sen have highlighted how Indian traditions accommodate pluralism and dialogue, rather than rigid universalism. In The Argumentative Indian, Sen contends that India’s intellectual heritage is marked by traditions of public reasoning and sustained engagement with competing viewpoints, where disagreement and diversity are treated as integral to social and moral life. From Buddhist debates to Ashoka’s policy of tolerance, Indian thought historically encouraged the coexistence of multiple normative perspectives instead of insisting upon a single, universally applicable conception of truth. This contrasts with legal traditions that seek to derive legitimacy from uniform and universal principles. Similarly, Bimal Patel argues that ancient Indian diplomatic practices reflected principles of coexistence and mutual respect, challenging the assumption that international law must be rooted in European history. These perspectives suggest that Indian thought is not incompatible with international law, as it offers an alternative normative foundation.
Relational justice, another key feature of Indian philosophy, prioritises interconnectedness over autonomy. This aligns with contemporary critiques of liberal individualism in international law, particularly in areas such as environmental governance and indigenous rights. For example, scholars like Karin Mickelson have argued for a more relational approach to global justice, one that recognises interdependence rather than sovereignty alone. Importantly, Indian traditions also challenge the rigid separation between law and morality that characterises positivist systems. As Radhabinod Pal’s dissent in the Tokyo Tribunal illustrates, legal reasoning rooted in broader ethical considerations can offer powerful critiques of dominant narratives. These contributions demonstrate that Indian thought is not merely historical; it has contemporary relevance for reimagining global norms.
Beyond Inclusion: The Need for Epistemic Redistribution
Current efforts to decolonise international law often focus on representation, with more scholars from the Global South, more diverse case studies, more inclusive narratives. While important, these measures remain superficial if they do not address underlying structures. As argued by scholars, decolonisation risks becoming a “managerial project” that accommodates diversity without altering power relations. True decolonisation requires epistemic redistribution. This means rethinking what counts as a source of law, whose knowledge is authoritative, and how legitimacy is constructed. For instance, integrating non-Western traditions into legal reasoning would challenge the dominance of positivism and open space for alternative normative frameworks. As Makau Mutua notes, human rights discourse itself is shaped by Western assumptions, often portraying the Global South as victims rather than agents.
Institutionally, this would require reforming global governance structures to reflect plural epistemologies. It also demands a shift in legal education, where curricula remain heavily Eurocentric. Scholars like James Thuo Gathii emphasise the need to “provincialise Europe” within international law, recognising it as one tradition among many rather than the universal standard. Crucially, epistemic redistribution is not about replacing one dominance with another. It is about creating a genuinely plural legal order where multiple traditions coexist and inform each other. This aligns with the idea of “dialogic universalism,” where universality emerges through engagement rather than imposition. Without such a shift, decolonisation will remain symbolic, leaving the core of international law unchanged.
Conclusion
The persistence of Eurocentrism in international law is not a historical accident; it is a structural feature that continues to shape global norms. Indian philosophical traditions, with their emphasis on duty, pluralism, and relational justice, offer valuable alternatives that remain underexplored. However, their inclusion alone is insufficient. Decolonising international law requires a deeper transformation: one that redistributes epistemic authority and reimagines the foundations of legitimacy itself. Until international law confronts not just what it excludes, but how it excludes, it will remain a system that speaks in universal terms while listening to only a few voices.
About the Author:
Mansi Khetan is a third-year B.B.A. LL.B. student at Jindal Global Law School with research interests in constitutional law, international trade, and corporate litigation. She has interned with leading practitioners, published on contemporary legal issues, and writes on foreign policy and global governance.
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