By Charudhi V G

Abstract

This article explores the concept of “One Nation, One Election” (ONOE) proposed by the Indian government, aiming to synchronise the electoral cycles of the states with that of the Union. While ONOE promises administrative efficiency and financial savings, its implementation requires extensive constitutional amendments, raising concerns about federalism and democratic principles. The government’s justifications for ONOE, focusing on cost reduction and administrative convenience, overlook the necessity of election spending for democratic integrity. Further, they disregard the flexibility provided by the Model Code of Conduct.

Introduction

With the general elections on the horizon, elections have become a common talking point in the country. Amidst this electoral climate, the government has proposed the idea of simultaneous elections. Branded as “One Nation One Election” the scheme seeks to resolve the problem of perpetual electoral cycles in the nation. The government aims to achieve this by syncing the electoral cycles of the states with the Union’s. It is interesting to note that the idea of simultaneous elections isn’t new to Indian politics. It existed as the norm until 1967. However, the system came to an end as a result of the breakdown of governance in several states. The reorganisation of states and the removal of governments resulted in a decrease in the percentage of states holding simultaneous elections, dropping to 76% in 1957, and 67% in both 1962 and 1967. The connection nearly vanished in the 1970s. Prime Minister Vajpayee first proposed the idea of simultaneous elections as part of electoral reforms. Prominent members of the BJP like Mr. L K Advani also proposed the same and a Law Commission Report in 1999 during Vajpayee’s tenure endorsed this proposal. While a report advocating for simultaneous elections was published by the Election Commission of India as well, the idea did not lead to any policy changes. 

The current government has revived the discourse surrounding simultaneous elections and has brought it to the forefront. The government’s argument for simultaneous elections is two-pronged. The first prong primarily rests on a financial argument. The government and the Election Commission have stated on multiple occasions that elections held constantly lead to increased expenditure. It is pertinent to note that their argument centres around not only the expenditure incurred by the state but also political parties. The second prong is directed at administrative efficiency. The Model Code of Conduct enforced by the Election Commission is the primary malefactor. The Model Code of Conduct does not allow the party in power to develop new policies and implement them during the prescribed period before the elections. This prohibition on the institution of new administrative policies before an election is what concerns the incumbent government. They are of the strong view that the staggered elections that are conducted throughout the country lead to the enforcement of several periods of prohibition on the government, which severely hinders their administrative capabilities and functioning.

Expenditure

The government’s financial argument is most commonly cited in favour of simultaneous elections. Elections are held across the country at the union and state level continuously, and this purportedly leads to severe financial constraints on the state. The Law Commission, in its report on simultaneous elections, discusses the financial implications of maintaining staggered elections. Through the graph provided below, it is evident that spending on Centre and State Assembly elections costs around the same. 

(source: https://legalaffairs.gov.in/sites/default/files/simultaneous_elections/LCI_2018_DRAFT_REPORT.pdf)

This duplication of costs is what the centre seeks to eliminate. Through simultaneous elections, the financial burden of conducting elections is not only borne by the Centre or State alone. Rather, it is borne by both equally. As per the report, this would significantly reduce the expenditure on continuous elections. The government, as the guardian of the state’s finances, has a duty towards the taxpayer’s money. This duty requires the government to make the best financial decisions for the citizens of the nation. The government is therefore adopting a financially conservative practice through simultaneous elections.

This argument can further be easily rejected through an analysis of the costs of elections. State Assembly elections held once every five years cost approximately 0.02% of the total budget of the government. Likewise, the Union’s expenditure on elections is minuscule in comparison to its budget. Further, it is essential to account for the logistical concerns of holding union and state elections simultaneously. As per the Law Commission’s Report,  huge amounts of expenditure will go into purchasing new EVMs to help conduct the elections. Combined elections would additionally imply a requirement for increased manpower, more warehousing facilities for the EVMs, and magnified expenditure for VVPAT.

While the expenses-oriented argument put forth by the centre may hold certain merit, it is challenging to agree that political parties’ incurring costs is an issue of national importance. The expenditures incurred by political parties, excessive or not, do not form an issue that warrants constitutional amendments and an overhaul of the election system. 

If this analysis is kept aside, however, and the claim that simultaneous elections result in cost savings is accepted, an important question arises: Is reducing election costs necessary?

To answer this an evaluation of the current electoral process is necessary. Currently, the management of the voter list has significant discrepancies and flaws in its basic processes. Further, P. Thiaga Rajan notes that a histogram analysis of voters by age in India reveals under-enrollment of 18 to 25-year-old voters, that is indicative of critical omission in voter lists. Further, he has cited instances of wrongful inclusions, such as the R.K. Nagar bye-elections of 2017, where over 47,000 entries were deleted due to inconsistencies. Post-deletion analysis even revealed inexplicable instances of duplicate entries, with one voter ID appearing six times across five different booths, featuring variations in age, gender, and name. These instances underscore the necessity for meticulous and comprehensive voter list management. It is therefore essential to adequately utilise public funds for elections and not limit them. This ensures that constitutional processes are upheld by securing a fair and transparent electoral system for all citizens.

Model Code of Conduct

The Model Code of Conduct (MCC) forms a comprehensive set of guidelines established by the Election Commission of India, outlining the behaviour expected from political parties and candidates during election campaigns and polling periods. It specifies the conduct expected from incumbent party ministers when the Code is in effect and provides a framework for them to file complaints with Election Commission observers in the event of disputes. The code becomes operative after election dates are announced and remains in effect until the results are declared. This code applies to all levels of elections, from the Lok Sabha and state assemblies to local governing bodies. The Law Commission’s Draft Report in 2018 further details that the implementation of the MCC forbids the government from: (i) making any promises or announcements concerning financial grants; (ii) laying the groundwork for projects or schemes of any kind, unless civil servants carry them out; (iii) making any promises regarding the building of roads, the provision of drinking water facilities, etc.; or (iv) making any ad hoc appointments in the government, public undertakings, etc. The government believes that these rules enforced therefore lead to policy paralysis, and the same is reflected in the report by a Parliamentary Standing Committee on the feasibility of holding simultaneous elections to the Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies.

However, it is pertinent to note that a plain reading of these guidelines reveals that the statements made by the government concerning “policy paralysis” form gross exaggerations. This is primarily due to three reasons. First, the guidelines indicate that projects already underway are not under the purview of the MCC. Only new projects introduced within the period of the MCC are strictly barred. Second, governments have the power to propose and implement new policies when the MCC is in force, subject to the approval of the Election Commission. This caveat exists to enable quick administrative action during emergencies, calamities, and other pressing concerns that arise to ensure the smooth governance of the country. Further, the rulings on these proposals are given by the Election Commission swiftly with a majority of the decisions coming out within 5 days. The Model Code of Conduct therefore provides for exceptions and does not lead to a standstill administrative decision. Lastly, the period during which the MCC applies is not excessive and is reasonable in its application as it generally lasts about a month for State Legislative Assemblies and longer for the Lok Sabha elections.

It is essential to note that the Model Code of Conduct is a crucial part of the democratic structure of the nation. The Election Commission described the origins of the Model Code of Conduct through, a detailed written statement to the High Court of Punjab. It began in 1960, before the general election, by The Government of Kerala through discussion and endorsement of major political parties. The following years witnessed several states adopting this model code of conduct through the endorsement of their political parties. This process gradually culminated in acceptance at both the state and national levels. The code is therefore a product of a collaborative effort between the Election Commission and political parties to help ensure free and fair elections. All political parties emphasised the necessity of conforming to the MCC and welcomed the Commission’s efforts in securing its compliance. They argued that its implementation is essential for free and fair elections by guaranteeing that none of the parties can unfairly benefit from their position of power at the polls. The significance of this requirement was so strongly felt that certain political parties advocated for its implementation to commence three months before the polling date.

The need for free and fair elections that arises from democracy therefore rises far above the need for complete administrative efficiency.

Constitutional Breakdown?

In light of democratic structures and the requirement for free and fair elections, it is important to note the heavy criticism that this proposal has faced. These criticisms are primarily concerned with the changes to the constitutional framework that ‘One Nation, One Election’ requires. To understand this, a reading of the current constitutional provisions about elections and the general tenure of legislative assemblies is essential. Articles 83 and 172 of the Indian Constitution prescribe a five-year duration for the legislative houses of the Union and the States, respectively. To ensure simultaneous elections, the primary goal would be to ensure that governments in power complete their entire term of five years. Since the provision of ‘no-confidence’ exists, there is a possibility that if a situation arises wherein the House loses confidence in the ruling party, there will be a government breakdown. To prevent this and other complications, the government must bring in a slew of constitutional amendments. These constitutional amendments required for the implementation of simultaneous elections have faced strong dissent from the opposition, and various legal commentators on grounds of federalism, democracy, and the basic structure of the Constitution. 

The Law Commission has, however, responded to these allegations through its report. For allegations against federalism in particular, it details several judgments given by the Supreme Court that describe Indian Federalism as distinct from “traditional” forms of federalism. The unitary structure of the nation is cited several times, and federalism is cloaked under this structure. This analysis of Indian Federalism disregards the true form federalism takes in India today. Federalism transformed and rooted itself in the electoral landscape as a result of the dissolutions and the reorganisation of states that led to the phenomenon of staggered elections. Strong regional politics that grew through these phenomena and the slew of coalition governments in the 80s and 90s grounded the importance of federalism as an essential part of the nation’s basic structure. The dismissal of this evolution by the Law Commission Report reeks heavily of the union stifling and undermining the autonomy and importance of the states. The other criticisms are responded to in a similar lackadaisical fashion and do not directly address the issues.

Conclusion

While the concept of simultaneous elections holds promise for increased administrative efficiency and reduced costs, in effect, it does neither. The reasoning employed by the government is flawed, as it does not account for the systems that these reasonings operate within. A basic perusal of the Model Code of Conduct reveals that administrative efficiency does not vanish in one month and that the expenses saved through simultaneous elections would be minuscule. Further, the constitutional implications of a system that mandates synchronised elections raise significant concerns that challenge the principles of federalism and democracy and violate the basic structure of the nation. Therefore, a re-evaluation of the necessities that deem ‘One Nation, One Election’ an absolute requirement must be undertaken – as the current rationale employed simply does not hold water.

Author’s Bio

Charudhi VG is pursuing her third year, BA LLB at Jindal Global Law School. Her interest
areas include constitutional law, criminal law, data privacy, and competition law.