By – Sai Ruchitha
Abstract
This article critically evaluates the Social Security Code, 2020, focusing on its impact on gig workers, women domestic workers, and fixed-term employees in India. While the Code expands coverage and aligns several provisions with ILO standards, many protections remain discretionary rather than enforceable rights. The reforms represent progress in principle but fall short in ensuring practical, accountable, and equitable protection for vulnerable workers.
Introduction:
The new Code on Social Security, 2020, introduced in November 2025, reflects India’s attempt to ensure universal social protection for organised, unorganised, gig, and platform workers. This new code has been lauded for finally recognising gig/platform workers in the unorganised sector, extending EPFO and ESIC coverage nationwide, bringing more establishments and workers under social security benefits, and even giving pro-rata gratuity for fixed‑term employees after just one year. However, it’s important to question the actual effectiveness of these reforms in lieu of the recent protests organised by the gig/platform workers. It raises questions of whether ‘gig workers’ and ‘women domestic workers’ who operate outside traditional employer-employee relationships are genuinely protected under the Code. Even under the organised sector, making fixed-term employees eligible for gratuity after only “one year” may incentivise employers to increasingly rely on such contracts instead of creating permanent employment opportunities.
This article seeks to analyse these issues and evaluate whether the reforms under the Code on Social Security, 2020, truly achieve their stated objectives when compared with earlier laws. It will also assess the extent to which these reforms align with International Labour Organization (ILO) standards to assess its stance when compared internationally. Although India has not ratified all ILO conventions, as a founding member, the ILO’s framework continues to significantly influence its labour legislation and will serve as a guide to identify potential improvements in the Code.
Gig and Platform Workers:
Gig and Platform workers include app-based delivery workers (e.g., Zomato, Swiggy), ride-hailing (under Rapido). For the first time, social security benefits have been extended to these workers under Sections 113 & 114 of the Code on Social Security, 2020. It requires Aggregators(digital intermediary apps) to contribute 1–2% of turnover to support health, pension, and insurance benefits for these workers. This is a very important reform that lets gig workers remain independent but receive collective benefits, unlike the earlier regime, which did not even recognise these workers. Even internationally, no binding global convention yet covers gig work, but the ILO is actively developing one. Human Rights Watch and others have urged the ILO (via a 2025 joint declaration) to adopt a convention for “platform workers,” noting that globally these workers often face misclassification, low pay, and exclusion from social security. On paper, India appears to be “moving towards global norms” by expanding the scope of social security coverage, perhaps even ahead of evolving ILO standards. However, the practical reality suggests quite the opposite. The benefits to ‘gig’ and ‘platform’ workers under Sec 114 of the codes use permissive language such as “may frame”, “may provide”.So even if there is recognition of these workers, there are still no mandatory ‘enforceable rights’. They continue working long hours with no claim to social security benefits. Most welfare remains voluntary and scheme-dependent. What’s the point of finally permitting the creation of welfare schemes, but not guaranteeing minimum wage, PF, ESI, or other enforceable entitlements which are important for ‘social security’ of gig/platform workers?
Further, ‘Gig workers’ remain outside traditional employer-employee frameworks. Platforms continue to classify workers as “independent contractors” or “delivery partners,” thereby avoiding obligations such as minimum wages, PF, ESI, paid leave, and compensation, despite workers routinely putting in 12–15-hour days with no income security. Even before the new SS code, it was very well observed that ambiguity around the employer-employee relationship did not effectively protect ‘gig workers’. In Dhrangadhara Chemical Works v. State of Saurashtra (1957), the Supreme Court relied on the control and supervision test to determine such a relationship. This was later expanded in Ram Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh (2004) to include control over the manner of work, hiring, firing, and wage-setting. However, platform companies may continue to exploit this regulatory gap as there are still no changes made to this in the new SS code. By relying on remote and concealed forms of control, they strategically avoid classification under a formal employer–employee relationship and thereby escape core labour obligations. Even Human Rights Watch, in its proposal urging the ILO to draft new rules for gig and platform workers, has stressed the importance of protecting them from ‘exploitative forms of management’. This indicates that merely recognising such workers in law and creating a funding mechanism may be insufficient to secure genuinely “decent work” in the platform economy.
Women Workers and Domestic Workers:
However, the limitations seen in the Code’s treatment of gig and platform workers also extend to gendered labour, where, despite the inclusive rhetoric they fail to extend to women of all classes. The Code does introduce several work-centric provisions, like how maternity leave has been expanded to 26 weeks (up from 12 weeks under the old law), including provisions for adoptive and surrogate mothers, and nursing breaks and crèche facilities are mandated. These enhancements exceed the ILO’s minimum (Maternity Protection Convention No.183 sets 14 weeks leave) and align Indian law with global standards of gender-sensitive labour rights. Thus, in principle, many women employees of the middle class are better off than before: they now get longer paid leave, easier certification of pregnancy (an ASHA worker or midwife can certify), and other accommodations under one unified law.
However, large numbers of women in informal jobs remain in precarious positions. The Code treats domestic helpers as “unorganised workers” eligible for any welfare schemes a State frames, but critics point out there is no dedicated legislation or enforcement. The SS Code leaves household employer participation voluntary, weakening accountability for domestic workers’ rights under Section 113 of the Code. Aadhaar-based self-registration ignores barriers like digital exclusion, lack of proof of employment, and fear of job loss, resulting in very low enrolment. The Code also does not mandate employer-funded maternity, health, or insurance benefits for women domestic workers. Hence, even if the new code greatly improves statutory rights for women in the organized workforce, it falls short of fully protecting women in the unorganized sectors. Domestic workers’ rights still lack enforceable mechanisms and comprehensive social security, even contrary to ILO Convention No.189 (Decent Work for Domestic Workers), which requires equal treatment (minimum wages, hours, social security, etc.).
Fixed-Term Employees
For fixed-term (contract) employees in the organized sector, the new Code provides a clear benefit: gratuity and pension eligibility after just one year of service, instead of the earlier 5-year vesting period. Under Section 53, a fixed-term worker who completes 12 months of continuous service must now receive pro-rated gratuity – effectively equalizing them with permanent staff for this benefit. The Code embraces the ILO principle of “equal treatment” for non-standard workers (i.e, ILO Part-Time Work Convention No.175 on equal pay) by granting fixed-term workers the same benefits as permanent ones.
Nonetheless, concerns remain as the new SS code does not restrict excessive use of fixed-term contracts. The ILO Termination of Employment Recommendation (No.166, 1982) advises that repeated short-term contracts should be converted into indefinite ones to prevent abuse. The Code makes no such conversion rule; in effect, it only equalizes benefits (gratuity, pension) but leaves employers free to rely on successive fixed-term hires. Thus, some critics warn that this reform could paradoxically encourage greater casualization as firms might simply keep workers on 1-year contracts, paying a little extra gratuity each time, instead of offering full permanent jobs. Hence, fixed-term employees now get more secure benefits, which is a clear improvement, but their underlying job security (against repeated contract renewals) is not enhanced. This falls short of what ILO instruments would prescribe for adequate safeguards.
Conclusion
The Code on Social Security, 2020, marks major progress by expanding statutory protections to more workers, recognising gig and platform labour, and strengthening maternity benefits, moving India closer to universal coverage and several ILO-aligned principles. However, the reforms remain only partially effective in practice: women domestic workers and gig/platform workers continue to lack enforceable rights and employer accountability, registration and implementation structures are weak, and fixed-term contracts may proliferate without improving job security. While the Code establishes an important framework, additional legislative measures and stronger enforcement are necessary to ensure that its intended protections are fully realised, especially for the most vulnerable categories of workers.
About the Author:
Sai Ruchitha is a third-year BBA LLB student. This paper focuses on labour rights, gender justice, and the evolving status of gig and platform workforces in India. Her work aims to contribute to informed policy debate and promote stronger protections for vulnerable workers.
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