By – Mansi Khetan

Abstract 

This article examines whether China’s Digital Silk Road (DSR) exports technology-enabled authoritarianism or reflects broader shifts in global governance. It situates this debate within a rising multipolar order where middle powers like India and Japan gain influence, and BRICS builds alternatives to U.S.-led financial systems. Using a comparative geopolitical analysis, the article explores how India-China engagement and South-South cooperation challenge Western narratives of rivalry. It concludes that the DSR debate reveals not merely a power reshuffle but an emerging redistribution of rule-making authority toward more plural and cooperative global governance. 

Introduction 

Over the last decade, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has acquired a digital arm, the Digital Silk Road (DSR). The DSR packages Chinese hardware, software and standards from undersea cables to data centres, e-governance platforms, smart-city sensors and AI surveillance into bilateral infrastructure deals with states across Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Indo-Pacific. At the same time, India and China, after a period of intense border confrontation, have taken cautious steps toward rapprochement, cooperating in multilateral groupings (BRICS, SCO) and in bilateral mechanisms. This creates an international environment where the United States no longer unilaterally sets the rules of digital and economic governance. It is imperative to look into the question of how digital infrastructure, diplomatic realignments and blunt U.S. trade and sanction tools are remaking global governance. 

China’s Digital Silk Road initiative and its critique 

Several democracies have expressed serious concerns regarding the Digital Silk Road (DSR), fearing that China may leverage this initiative to export its model of technology-enabled authoritarianism. Such a model, they argue, could undermine personal freedoms and compromise the sovereignty of participating nations. However, what remains striking is the lack of equivalent criticism directed toward the United States, whose hegemonic dominance in international decision-making has long gone largely unquestioned. This disparity can be attributed to the fact that the United States has historically marketed itself as a champion of democracy, liberty, and diplomacy, promoting ideals that appear rational, non-discriminatory, and unambiguous. For decades, this strategic self-presentation shielded it from accusations of coercive influence. The joke’s on them. Since the entry of the Trumpian era, the reality of the deeply entrenched conservative and nationalist ideologies within American politics is publicly established with unvarnished honesty. The U.S. no longer conceals its role as a powerful global actor that has frequently interfered in the decision-making processes of sovereign states and shaped international outcomes to its advantage.  In this light, the criticism of China’s growing influence through the DSR reveals itself as somewhat hypocritical. The underlying concern is less about safeguarding freedoms and more about the fact that U.S. hegemony is being challenged. As the locus of power shifts, the rise of Asian nations threatens America’s long-standing dominance, making the resistance to China’s Digital Silk Road a reflection of strategic insecurity rather than principled objection. The U.S. no longer conceals its role as a powerful global actor that has frequently interfered in the decision-making processes of sovereign states and shaped international outcomes to its advantage.  In this light, the criticism of China’s growing influence through the DSR reveals itself as somewhat hypocritical. The underlying concern is less about safeguarding freedoms and more about the fact that U.S. hegemony is being challenged. As the locus of power shifts, the rise of Asian nations threatens America’s long-standing dominance, making the resistance to China’s Digital Silk Road a reflection of strategic insecurity rather than principled objection. 

Multipolarity and changing global order 

The idea of multipolarity is increasingly gaining clarity and clearing out the proposed blurred vision of it. For the last 30 years, the United States has been the undisputed global leader. With the middle powers, from Japan to India, becoming more significant and influential by developing political and financial relations amongst each other, it poses a major threat to the consistent hegemony of the United States. The share of the global economy controlled by Washington, Moscow, and their two alliance blocs was a whopping 88 percent of global GDP in 1950; today, these countries only make up 57 percent of global GDP. That power has diffused elsewhere, moving away from superpowers toward a variety of capable, dynamic middle powers that will help to shape the international environment in the near future. The most famous critique of the increasing demand and implementation of the DSR is that such sensor networks, facial recognition software and centralised data platforms can be repurposed by authoritarian regimes for mass surveillance and social control. For democracies and human rights advocates, the worry remains twofold. The adoption of these systems makes it easier for weak or illiberal governments to keep surveillance and repress their own populations, and China’s growing role in digital infrastructure gives it leverage over standards and rules for cross-border data flows and governance. While, this remains a valid problem to be discussed, the question to ask, is if a country like the United States commences a similar action, what ensures their promise on transparency and them upholding privacy principles. These backlashes against China are coupled with the United States’ longstanding fear of a multipolar world with Asian powers equating the large influence historically demonstrated by the United States. longstanding fear of a multipolar world with Asian powers equating the large influence historically demonstrated by the United States.  

Emerging South-Asian leaders  

BRICS and BRICS+ now represent a larger share of world GDP (by PPP) than the G7 and are actively exploring alternatives to dollar-centric finance with new development bank operations, swap lines, and currency-diversification measures. The expansion of BRICS membership and its growing coordination on technology and trade choices is a concrete institutional channel that can blunt unilateral policy levers formerly wielded by Washington. Many analysts, therefore, depict BRICS expansion as a watershed moment in the shift to a more egalitarian international system. Some countries view BRICS not merely as a refuge from U.S. diplomatic pressure, sanctions and demands to democratize, but as a practical vehicle for deeper economic integration outside a shrinking Western-centric order. Rather than reflexively rejecting initiatives like China’s Digital Silk Road, many states see value in pragmatic partnerships, participating in jointly governed digital and infrastructure projects that can broaden access to financing, technical capacity and standard-setting power, and thereby diffuse influence more widely across a greater number of states. Thus, constructive engagement in multinational projects can empower smaller and middle powers by giving them a seat at the table and more leverage within global governance, rather than simply treating such initiatives as zero-sum instruments of domination.  

Revival of India-China relations and a south-south corporation  

The India–China relationship has entered a phase of renewed warmth and deepening engagement, marked by sustained high-level diplomatic exchanges since late 2024. The India-China border agreement of 21 October 2024 led to the first meeting since 2019 between Prime Minister Modi and President Xi during the BRICS summit, paving the way for military disengagement in Ladakh and renewed high-level dialogue. This was followed by meetings between their foreign and defence ministers, an agreement on resuming religious pilgrimages, river data sharing, direct flights, and media exchanges. National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri also held talks with Chinese counterparts, reinforcing the momentum. India has called for a “stable and predictable path,” while China has urged both nations to be “partners rather than rivals,” signalling a warming of ties and progress in resolving long-standing issues. This calls out the powerful Western media outlets who have repeatedly foregrounded frames that highlight India-China disputes, treating border skirmishes or diplomatic spats as proof of a civilizational contest, while promoting the idea that New Delhi must be enlisted as a counterweight to Beijing. Pieces in outlets and policy journals urging Washington to “use India as a bridge” and warning that India and China are locked in a struggle for the Global South have helped harden public perceptions in both capitals, making cooperation politically costly. That mis-marketing does real harm, it weakens the possibility of South–South cooperation, provides cover for unilateral coercive measures by outside powers, and diverts attention from mutually beneficial projects like coordinated infrastructure, technology governance, and development finance that could empower a more plural global order. If leaders in Beijing and New Delhi want to blunt this manufactured narrative, they should take clear, visible steps to change how the public sees their relationship and show through joint projects and talks that cooperation, not rivalry, better advances the interests of the Global South. If leaders in Beijing and New Delhi want to blunt this manufactured narrative, they should take clear, visible steps to change how the public sees their relationship and show through joint projects and talks that cooperation, not rivalry, better advances the interests of the Global South. 

Conclusion 

In conclusion, the Digital Silk Road, India-China rapprochement and Washington’s economic coercion signal is not a simple reshuffle but a redistribution of rule-making power.  Where once standards, finance and digital architecture flowed outward from a single dominant centre, we now see multiple hubs offering alternative models which include Chinese suppliers and standards embedded through DSR projects, BRICS and regional fora proposing dollar alternatives and India balancing between autonomy and bilateral engagement. These are practical, institution-building moves, not mere rhetorical posturing. The future of a stable, rules-based global order depends less on trying to reinstate a vanished unipolarity and more on designing inclusive mechanisms that distribute authority and embed checks on power. If Beijing, New Delhi and democratic partners can convert competition into standards competition with enforceable safeguards, the result will be a more plural but also more resilient global governance architecture, which is built on cooperation and not coercion. 

About the Author:   

Mansi Khetan is a third-year B.B.A. LL.B. student at Jindal Global Law School with research interests in constitutional law, international trade, and corporate litigation. She has interned with leading practitioners, published on contemporary legal issues, and writes on foreign policy and global governance. 

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