By Samyak Rachit Banerjee
Abstract
India’s journey towards military self-reliance has been shaped by its historical, financial, and geopolitical challenges. Initially dependent on first-world countries for defence technology due to financial constraints and bureaucratic inefficiencies, India gradually transitioned towards self-reliance. The 1962 Sino-Indian conflict and the 1971 war with Pakistan were pivotal moments that highlighted the need for indigenous defence capabilities. With support from the Soviet Union, India began modernising its military, including the successful development of its nuclear weapons program. The 1990s saw significant milestones with economic liberalisation, the Pokhran 2 nuclear tests, and the Kargil War, all of which underscored India’s determination to achieve military self-reliance. This analysis examines the financial, political, and bureaucratic obstacles that India overcame in its pursuit of defence indigenization, ultimately leading to a burgeoning military-industrial complex.
Introduction
A country’s chances of winning a war depends on it’s ability to generate new defence technology and mass produce the technology along with appropriate strategies, to gain the ultimate upper hand against the adversary. Since its independence, India had been militarily dependent on first world countries for defence technology due to financial issues, issues regarding efficiency of bureaucracy, and until recently, the prevention of the procurement of indigenous defence technologies. This article aims to analyse the financial, political and bureaucratic obstacles to rapid defence indigenisation and how the same obstacles acted as catalyst for India’s military self-reliance.
Defence Dependency and a Budding Military-Industrial Complex
India’s approach to defence has developed alongside its foreign policy. Beginning with Nehru’s idealism, moving through a phase of hard realism, and now reflecting a blend of idealism and realism seen in the policy of multi-alignment. Until 1962, India’s defence strategy primarily considered potential armed conflicts with Pakistan,\. China was not perceived as a threat to India’s security at that time. The inadequate infrastructure in the north-east hindered the rapid deployment of troops, alongside logistical challenges in their maintenance. Furthermore, the Army’s weaponry and equipment were largely from World War II and were undergoing upgrades. For instance, the .303 Rifle was being replaced with a semi-automatic version, and older infantry and artillery mortars were being updated to newer models.
As noted earlier, the deliberate lack of infrastructure development in the northeast had serious consequences for India during the 1962 war with China, serving as a catalyst for the development of India’s military-industrial complex. This was evident in three significant aspects. Firstly, the Defense Budget in 1963 was allocated 4% of India’s GNP, compared to the 2.7% allocated in 1962. Secondly, the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict triggered a heightened defence awareness in India. Following the immediate post-war needs, organised defence planning commenced in 1964. Finally, in 1965, a Planning Cell was set up to collaborate with the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and assist in managing broader defence planning concerns. This Planning Cell formulated the defence five-year plan and aimed to ensure regular communication between the Planning Commission, other ministries, and facilitate medium to long-term defence planning.
Due to mainly financial and skilled labour constraints, India in this era had trouble procuring defence technologies in a large and thus had to depend on other powers to import the technologies from. The Soviet Union in this way became a reliable partner of India leading up to the 1971 war. One factor was the United States’ political decision in 1964 to deny the sale of F-104 jets to India, which created an opportunity for the Soviets to become a supplier instead, selling the MiG-21s to India since 1963. Subsequently, post the 1971 war victory, India shifted its focus towards China, as the military gap between the two countries widened over the years. This was underscored by China’s nuclear test in 1964, prompting India to take notice of this development. By 1972, China’s defence spending was recorded at US$ 31.1 billion, significantly surpassing India’s expenditure of US$ 2.93 billion.
Initial Steps to Military Independence
India’s military strategy towards China hence included two key elements: developing a nuclear weapons program to deter Chinese nuclear blackmail and enhancing its conventional military capability, especially the army’s high-altitude mountain warfare and the air force’s air support capabilities, to counter any advances by the PLA into Indian territory along the disputed border. A shining example of the former is India’s operation Smiling Buddha which was India’s nuclear weapon program tested in Pokhran in 1974. India was increasingly concerned about China’s growing relationship with the United States, which in turn pushed India closer to the Soviet Union. These factors, coupled with India’s recognition of the necessity for military self-reliance, shaped the country’s security policy for the rest of the 20th century.
With backing from the Soviet Union, the Indian Navy began a gradual buildup of its ability to patrol the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, safeguarding India’s extensive coastline. Simultaneously, the Indian Air Force commenced a significant modernization of its fleet of Soviet-made fighter jets, including the MiG-21 and the Sukhoi Su-7, both of which demonstrated effectiveness during the 1971 Bangladesh war.
India’s evolving global standing influenced its military modernization after the 1970s. By the late 1980s, India shifted from state socialism to neoliberalism, resulting in robust economic growth and providing ample financial resources for large-scale defence procurement. Indira Gandhi advocated for the modernization of the military, which strengthened national security. However, this also led to her temptation, as a leader, to use the military to intervene in the country’s internal politics. This was evident in 1984 during Operation Blue Star in Amritsar, which tragically resulted in her assassination later that year.
In the 1980s, India launched the Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP), a comprehensive indigenous missile development initiative led by Dr. APJ Abdul Kalam, initiated in 1983. Key achievements of IGMDP encompassed developing infrastructure and training talent (1983-84), advancing Prithvi and Trishul missiles (1984-89), mastering Nag anti-tank and Akash SAM missiles (1989-92), and demonstrating the success of mature Agni ballistic missiles (1992-2008). IGMDP helped India become part of the select group of countries possessing missiles, showcasing its technological prowess in strategic deterrence. Additionally, the program led to the development of technologies like the Long-Range Tracking System, advanced composite materials, high-accuracy ring laser gyros, and radomes. It established the groundwork for the Integrated Missile Development Center, Defense Technology Center, and the Advanced Center for Energetic Materials.
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, India became apprehensive about its international position, given that its primary ally had disintegrated. This situation prompted India to pursue greater self-sufficiency in its military capabilities. The 1990s in India are notable for three significant events: the economic liberalisation of 1991, the nuclear tests at Pokhran in 1998, and the Kargil War in 1999. Between May 11 and May 13, 1998, India made a significant impact by carrying out a sequence of subterranean nuclear tests, involving five bombs, in Pokhran, Rajasthan. The tests commenced at 3:45 pm on May 11, under the designated name Operation Shakti, starting with the detonation of one fusion and two fission bombs.
Barriers to Self Reliance
India now has a defence industrial base consisting of 52 defence laboratories and establishments under the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO), as well as 9 defence public sector undertakings and 39 ordnance factories under the Department of Defense Production of the Ministry of Defense. However, until recently, India could not be a militarily self reliant power due to several barriers, one being the financial constraint. In 1960, India’s defence budget was only $680 million. Over the next 20 years, the budget increased very slowly. The defence budget began to experience a significant increase only after 1984, with annual rises amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars. In 1984, the budget stood at $6.96 billion and escalated to $20.24 billion over the next 20 years, by 2004.
India’s defence industry did receive proper funding after 1984, but this late influx of funds significantly delayed India’s modernization and self-reliance efforts. In addition to financial constraints, India faced geopolitical challenges. The country was not initially seen as trustworthy with advanced weaponry, possibly due to Nehru’s socialist leanings. Nehru’s request for US assistance during the 1962 war came too late, as China had already declared a ceasefire by the time the US could respond to his letter. This delay might have reinforced the perception of India’s unreliability, potentially contributing to the US’s decision to refuse to sell F-104 jets to India in 1964. This continuous mistrust by the US played a role in fostering the partnership between India and the Soviet Union.
In 1978, the United States increased pressure on India by introducing the Nonproliferation Treaty, which mandated inspections of all nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency. India’s refusal to comply led to the US halting all nuclear assistance. This pattern repeated even after India conducted the Pokhran 2 nuclear tests in 1998, resulting in sanctions by the US. Ultimately, these actions only served to push India further towards self-reliance and building its military industrial complex.
Author’s Bio
Samyak Rachit Banerjee is a third year student in the Jindal School of International Affairs. He is interested in India-China relations and India’s domestic policies.
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