By Jigyasa Maloo

Abstract

The West Africa subregion, tucked between the Sahara Desert in the north and the Gulf of Guinea in the south, is in cataclysm. The past three years have witnessed a coup epidemic, the last straw to the semblance of civilian government ensuing with the coup in Niger. In total, 7 successful military coups occurred – Mali (2020 and 2021), Chad (2021), Guinea (2021), Burkina Faso (two in 2022), and Niger (2023). The article attempts to comprehend the state of disarray with a specific emphasis on the role and efficacy of ECOWAS, a regional bloc in effect of the recent joint withdrawal by Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.

Fight against French Influence: A common disenchantment

In West Africa, a majorly Francophone belt, the pre-eminence of France has been unassailable. Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger were all French colonies, and since decolonization, France maintained neo-colonial influence via military, economic, political, and diplomatic levels – also known by the term “Françafrique“. This neocolonial relationship established a repressive system such as syphoning valuable resources, and propping up corrupt elites. At the same time, the populations are either experiencing a sharp deterioration in security or significant economic and development inequalities. This gradually enkindled deep-rooted ‘anti-French sentiment’ among the masses.

The anti-French vitriol is said to originate in Mali. Not too long ago, in 2013, France started assisting the Malian Government in their fight against Jihadists through ‘Operation Barkhane’. France became the principal international security partner. Notwithstanding its importance and high cost, the exclusive military-first approach meant the successes made far outweighed the realities on the ground. In the eyes of the public, the French intervention further exacerbated violence and terrorism and destabilised the wider region. The civilian governments were incapable of protecting its territory let alone the population – the French support soon became a liability. It was compounded by Frances’ double standard, the inconsistencies between certain political stances, and the promotion of liberal democratic values. They defended certain autocracies and denied democratic backsliding.

The military putschists in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, exploited and weaponized the anti-French sentiment. As a consequence, a large part of the population supported the military coups in their country. In all three countries post-coup, the military juntas called for the discontinuation of French troops on their soil, the expulsion of diplomats, and the banning of French TV and radio channels – RFI and France 24. In Mali, the coup accelerated the withdrawal of the ‘United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali’ (MINUSMA) in December of 2023, further marking the end of a crucial UN-led peacekeeping effort in the region.

ECOWAS: A Vision for Unified West Africa

The Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS), a 15-member nation sub-regional bloc, traces its origin to the Treaty of Lagos signed in 1975. ECOWAS envisioned a noble mission of establishing and achieving economic integration in a region, notoriously referred to as a ‘coup belt’. The broadening of focus from economic and trade advancement to engagement for safeguarding regional peace and security in the 90s  marked a shift from the initial vision. The community became a ‘custodian of democratic norms’ and a force against military coups. With the installation of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), the military arm, the community regularly intervened to restore peace in the region. In the 1990s for instance, ECOWAS intervened in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea Bissau. On the other hand, the 2001 forward-looking Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, underlined ‘zero tolerance for power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means’. The protocol also laid down that ‘every accession to power must be made through free, fair transparent elections.’ The problem, however, remains – under the framework, it is the election that matters, not the leader. Thus, an autocrat or military leader is good and legitimate no matter if they grab power through an election.

Furthermore, this selective approach is rooted within the ECOWAS structure. The chairperson of the community must be an incumbent head of state. However, leaders who obtained power via coups have been selected for this position, effectively legitimising their rule. Moreover, this selectiveness persists in how they tackle undemocratic affairs – difficulty in circumventing presidential terms, questionable re-elections, and corruption charges. It also underscores the limits to the ECOWAS toolkit in dealing with the immense task of consolidating democratic governance across the region. Their questionable track record further prevails in addressing human rights, the rule of law, and rooting out insurgencies and terrorism.

The Joint Decision: Cascading effect in the region

On January 28, 2024, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, on claims of ‘sovereign decision’, in a joint communique announced they would depart from ECOWAS despite the provision in the ECOWAS treaty stipulating a one-year notice period. The unilateral decision marked the final blow to the eroding influence of ECOWAS in the region. In the joint statement, they accused ECOWAS of ‘drifting from the ideals of its founding fathers and the spirit of pan-Africanism’. Additionally, the military authorities resented that ECOWAS had “betrayed its founding principles”, and “become a threat to member states and peoples” and was not the much-needed shield against insurgencies and jihadists. While the justification given is not entirely concocted, the reason makes the putschist look benevolent – as ‘saviours’ of the African population. However, the departure has essentially been for regime survival. The failure of ECOWAS to reverse the status quo significantly indicates the weakening stature that could trigger a domino effect leading to interminable military transitions and further coups d’état.

It is crucial to note that ECOWAS had already been suspended following the military takeover in these respective countries. Moreover, sanction packages implemented include a commercial no-fly zone, the freeze of all assets held in ECOWAS bank, and the suspension of aid by foreign countries. In Niger, a complete border closure, suspension of financial transactions, and freezing of the country’s assets in external banks has turned counterproductive, hurting people not just in Niger but across the bloc of countries. A major act of reprisal came with the formation of the ‘Alliance of Sahel State’ by Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger in September of 2023. The pact stands as a defence and military front – pledging support to one another when under attack. This alliance formation is said to have signalled the groups’ intention to seek political distance and autonomy from the bloc.

A Future in Hanging

ECOWAS is in a tight spot, either they keep the military juntas out until a civilian government is established or compromise by signalling a readiness to lift sanctions to preserve the community’s wavering union. The withdrawal does not bode well for ECOWAS, tangibly highlighting the symptoms of a worsening crisis in West Africa. The dire consequence for the region has been the closure of the cross-border movement of civilians, damage to economic and trade relations, and the rupture of diplomatic ties.

Undoing all efforts towards democracy, governance, peace, and security, the community now faces significant challenges in how to reorient and recalibrate its role and credibility. The newly found ‘Alliance of Sahel state’ militates against the efforts to bridge the schism within ECOWAS. The division and the subsequent political impasse have turned propitious for Russia, particularly the Wagner Group, which is supporting the three countries in its military and security affairs, substituting not just the regional bloc but also the longstanding French presence.  

About the Author: 
Jigyasa Maloo is pursuing Masters in Diplomacy, Law and Business from the Jindal School of International Affairs. She holds a bachelor’s degree in Political Science from St. Xavier’s College (Autonomous), Kolkata. Her areas of interest lie in conflict, and security, particularly in the Middle East and the Sahel region.

Image Source: https://theconversation.com/ecowas-why-withdrawal-of-mali-niger-and-burkina-faso-signals-fresh-trouble-for-the-sahel-222720