By Dheemant Anil
Abstract
The Indian Intervention in the Sri Lankan Civil War is a topic that has been ignored in mainstream knowledge of society. This war that India fought is required to be learned as it will allow India to learn from its mistakes and as it grows in its international stature, The notion of reopening old wounds emerges as a necessity for the collective to glean essential lessons from the past, particularly in the context of their involvement in a challenging historical conflict often referred to as “our dirty little war.”
Introduction
The Indian Intervention in the Sri Lankan Civil War is one of the most prominent policy failures of the Indian state and is still considered to be one of the most famous policy failures of the Nation. It is also one of the reasons behind the lack of will to deploy forces overseas.
The two major ethnic groupings of Sri Lanka were the Tamils and the Sinhalese. Eastern and northern regions of the island nation were populated primarily by the Tamil people. Throughout colonial authority, the two communities coexisted peacefully, defending one another’s rights.
Subsequently, the “Ceylon Citizenship Act,” a contentious law that discriminated against Tamils on purpose and prevented them from obtaining Sri Lankan citizenship, was passed in 1948. In the ensuing three decades, about three million Tamils were deported to India.
Simmering dissatisfaction among the Tamils was caused by various state measures. A conscious attempt was made to exclude Tamils from holding positions in the government and civil service when the “Sinhala Only Act” was passed in 1956. State-sponsored colonialism took place when the state permitted only Buddhism as its official religion and outlawed the importation of Tamil media. Documents regarding a distinct Tamil state, or “Tamil Eelam,” started to surface by the 1960s.
The LTTE or the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, emerged as one of the primary forces for the independence of the Tamil Eelam. This group soon mobilised and fired the first shot after the Black July riots, in which it ambushed a Sri Lankan Army Patrol, called Four Four Bravo.
A full-fledged civil war broke out in 1983 between the LTTE and the governing government. The Sri Lankan Armed Forces (SLAF) started a military campaign of conquest against the Tamil-dominated Jaffna peninsula when the government of Sri Lanka declared “Operation Liberation”.
Tamil Nadu’s political parties, the DMK, and the AIDMK, put pressure on the ruling government of India to help the Tamil people. If the Congress party hoped to win over these South Indian parties, they could not overlook this. India’s original intervention in Sri Lanka was limited to rescuing the Tamils. From 1977 until 1987, the Tamil militants received covert military training due to which India faced Sinhala nationalism.
The SLAF began a significant operation in May 1987. India decided to act and send food and medicinal supplies to the Tamils, but the Sri Lankan Navy ultimately drove them back. India responded by using its relatively Modern Air Force, in Operation Poomalai, Which was a warning to the Sri Lankan Administration to end the operation.
Rajiv Gandhi then decided to sign an accord with the then President of Sri Lanka, J R Jaya Wardhane, in return for the ending of the operation, India would deploy the IPKF. JR Jayawardane was joyous about this, boasting how he had turned a defeat into a victory.
The Troops selected for this were from the 54th Division, stationed in Gwalior. The 54th Division was designed to operate in the deserts of Thar, in a future war against Pakistan. Therefore, it was equipped with T-72 Tanks, one of the modern tanks of the Era, alongside BMP 1s and with MI 25 Akbar gunship. It was then asked to participate in an operation that was out of the purview of this division. It was being asked to perform what was a COIN operation in a built-up area. A war that it was not prepared for and something which was beyond its capacity to do.
The contingent was not helped by the situation that the Sri Lankan Media was horrified by the agreement and saw it as almost a new colonisation of their country, many thought that India planned to integrate Sri Lanka as a new State into the Union, while many were angry at the operation which was halted by the presence of the Indian troops.
This was not helped by the LTTE, as many of the people who were India’s Intelligence Mandarins saw them as an asset that could be used to create a more pliant Sri Lanka, and which would be used to ensure that Sri Lanka was reduced to a status of a client state of India. The LTTE wanted to have an independent state which would include all the Tamil people in Sri Lanka. This came into conflict and soon LTTE saw Indians not as trustworthy allies but rather as the New Opponent that they had to fight.
The Battles soon began, with the Indians being forced to fight in an atmosphere in which they would have to fight in an urban environment and against an enemy which was like the tactics used by the Chechen rebels in the City of Grozny, against the Russian Troops in the First Chechen War. Because of this, the Indian Armed Forces changed their tactics and started using their superior Armour and firepower. Like the Americans, MI 25 helicopters were used as flying artillery, which strafed anything that looked suspicious to the troops on the ground.
Tanks and Armoured Vehicles were then used as battering rams, destroying any structure that was housing the LTTE. The T72 proved its worth, as it managed to shrug off any anti-tank rockets sent by the enemy, and soon, Indian troops gained an upper hand. The LTTE was facing an opponent that was well equipped to do the task, and soon many Indian commanders planned one last major operation, hoping for an early end to this war. It was to be the proverbial crushing of the fly with a Jack Hammer, and as such mobilisation began for a final push.
However, certain problems came up while planning for this operation. Firstly, Indians had no Maps of the city of Jaffna and were forced to use maps of Tourist Services and had to rely on either intelligence services which were being provided by informants in the city, or had to go in blind. There was also the issue that many of the Indian troops were operating in an urban environment, which gave the defender a huge advantage.
The LTTE soon realized that conventionally fighting the Indians would be suicidal and instead went back to the old tactics of using ambushes mines and snipers. The most favoured tactic was to ambush officers and high-ranking personnel. Soon LTTE started employing the services of child Soldiers and were soon trying to gain back the strategic initiative. They were helped by the Sri Lankan Army which did not want the Indians to gain a victory in what was supposed to be their triumph in their war. So, they started working alongside the LTTE in trying to get the Indians out of the nation as a whole.
All of these factors combined into what became Operation Pawan, which was both a success and a failure at once. The Indians were able to take over the city and cause heavy casualties to the LTTE, so much so that in many areas the LTTE was not able to regain its strength and was forced to go back to its original tactics of ambushes and attacks by Snipers.
However, it ran into a problem that faced all foreign interventions. Many of the Indian Politicians wanted to end this war and bring their troops back which was also supported by the Sri Lankan Government. Therefore, in the year 1989, the IPKF was called back.
This intervention gave birth to, what is now known as the Sri Lankan syndrome, an Aversion to deploy Indian troops abroad. The war saw higher casualties than the wars with Pakistan ever did. The casualty rate, at 7 percent of all troops involved, was twice as high as in the wars against Pakistan. One of the five brigades that assaulted Jaffna, the 41st, which was airlifted on 17 October and was launched straight on the coastal road axis leading to Jaffna Fort, had 272 casualties, 22 percent of its strength.
The emphasis on the jointness of command and the imperative to comprehend the nature of future wars became apparent, highlighting the risk of repeating historical mistakes and the necessity to avoid revisiting and relearning lessons. Conversely, the insights gained from the experiences in Sri Lanka hold significant potential to assist India as it undergoes a resurgence in power.
Author’s Bio
Dheemant Anil is a student of law at the OP Jindal Global University and is an international Relations enthusiast. He is also a movie enthusiast and is interested in the history of the world and has been interested in learning about the world during the great wars and understanding why history happened the way it happened and would like to have a conversation with the history of the world and of the story of how the trade routes changed the world.
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