By Harshita Khaund

Abstract

While the 20th century has undeniably established itself as the century of democracy, China’s monumental rise to power as an economic behemoth while adhering to a conservative autocratic style of governance represents an anomaly to the established rule of democratic supremacy. This article analyzes how China’s amalgamation of strict disciplinary economic policies and limited free capital movement, underpinned by the construction of a centrally sanctioned narrative of ‘excellent traditional culture’ has given wings to soar to the Red Dragon. 

“All political power comes from the barrel of a gun. The Communist Party must command all the guns, that way, no guns can ever be used to command the party.”

Mao Zedong

Growth in China – Unfurling the Wings of the Eastern Dragon:

On 1^st July 2021, Chinese President Xi Jinping commemorated the centenary anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party with a vivacious speech defying Western ‘bullying’ and most importantly, lauding the progress achieved by the nation, its people and most of all, the Party itself. President Xi spoke at length about the crucial role played by the Party and how the roots of China’s progress are tethered to the Party.

Historically a nation burdened by its colonial past and excessively centralized bureaucratization which kept the nation isolated from the global economy, China’s trajectory of growth as a global power was a utopian dream – a myth concocted to entrench the fervour of a nationalist spirit. So when Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms liberalized China’s economy to foreign investment, making it one of the fastest-growing world economies averaging a real GDP growth of 9.5% till 2018 according to World Bank estimates, it tilted the very axis of world order. Posing as a threat to the hegemonic might of the United States of America, China’s rise to the status of superpower proved as a paragon for developing nations and a geopolitical security dilemma for traditional sites of power concentration in the West.

The dilemma in question has been particularly pertinent due to the autocratic framework of governance within which China has expanded and exerted its economic influence, domestically as well as internationally. Such massive economic growth generated great prosperity while pulling millions out of the poverty line and was successful under a one-party regime – a bureaucratized form of politics under the overarching umbrella of the Chinese Communist Party. Such an intertwining of economic modernization with a top-down model of governance defies the Western logic of viewing political liberalization as an eventual but definite consequence of economic liberalization. In the cultural realm, the CCP’s construction of centrally advanced propaganda by fusing party ideologies with traditional Chinese moral virtues has furthered the party theory of viewing the CCP as the dictator of what constitutes an ideal Chinese culture. Rigid deference to discipline and party propaganda has ensured that the party hierarchy is able to subdue much of popular unrest in a swift and decisive manner without destabilizing the economy. This begs the question – is autocracy essential to the growth of China?

Onwards and Upwards – the Success of Autocracy in China:

When in 1998 political writer Thomas Friedman stated: “Sooner or later this economy will slow… That’s when China will need a government that is legitimate. . . When China’s 900 million villagers get phones and start calling each other, this will inevitably become a more open country,” there was much enthusiasm for the democratization of China. Two decades later, even as the initial economic boom slowed down to a real GDP growth rate of 6.6%, China today is believed to have reached the zenith of development. After hitting the middle-income status, China is today reorienting towards new models of private consumption and reform initiatives such as ‘Made in China 2025’ which focuses on the upgradation of its manufacturing sector.

Scholar Daniel Bell in his book ‘The China Model’ proposed a defence of the Chinese model based on a conceptualization of power relations. Accordingly, the author points towards the flaws of democracy and the criteria of effectiveness as the sole guarantee of good governance. However, the concentration of absolute power which has historically caused immense devastation at the hands of Mao Zedong necessarily rings a warning bell. Of particular concern is the aggressive power hunt initiated by Xi Jinping towards a restructuring of power relations to be concentrated within the Party and effectively, within himself.

Simultaneously, the reasoning for China’s authoritarian success can be traced to the regime’s disciplinary policies directing individual savings towards industrial development and suffocating democratic dissent in terms of wage hikes to keep global labor markets competitive. Scholars have frequently pointed towards the correlation of high capital as a means for developing patronage and forfeiting political rights from those benefiting through high growth. On the external front, China’s advancement of loans and developmental aid to nations without any precursor of democratization is further seen as an enabling act for buoying authoritarian rule elsewhere.

However, as China increasingly faces the reality of falling into the middle-income trap even as GDP growth starts slowing down and its demographic dividend starts caving in, will the quest for political liberty start emerging in the foundational cracks of the economy? While maintaining the political status quo has been the priority for successive governments, scholars believe that the momentum for ‘irresistible democratic aspirations’ is building, one which will necessarily require regime change.

The Ideal Chinese Culture – A War of Ideas:

Perhaps the dragon to the East is perceptive of how an economic slowdown might disintegrate its party stronghold. This brings in ideological propaganda as an effective tool. In recent years, contrary to traditional philosophies of economic ladder-climbing as the dominant party manifesto, the CCP has sought to redefine itself as the successor of Chinese moral values underlined by ‘culturalism and collective values’. Employing cultural identity as a means of legitimizing the power held by the regime is not merely coincidental, but has been deployed as a conscious strategy to bring the population in line with an ‘Us vs. the West’ policy narrative and strengthen party cadre loyalty.

The institutionalization and bureaucratization of tradition have further been crucial towards solidifying a ‘common Chinese identity’ which enables the exercise of jurisdiction over diverse cultures ranging from Xinjiang to Inner Mongolia. In particular, party school systems have mandated the learning of Chinese Mandarin and saluting the Chinese flag in Uyghur detention camps, with some being forced to burn the Koran and eat pork as a sign of cultural assimilation. On the other hand, party school systems have reinforced practices of engaging with Chinese politics amongst party cadres in a manner feasible for entrenching the party in power.

This further explains the critical role of the Propaganda Department, which, in the wake of the collapse of the erstwhile Soviet Union, has identified political education and the controlling of free media as integral to sustaining the one-party regime. The importance of ‘ideological and political training’ of educators coupled with the creation of Document No. 9 which listed ideals of Western constitutional democracy as an ‘incorrect way of thinking’ reveals the ideological shrines of autocracy which the CCP is constructing.

Democracy in China – a Distant Utopia? :

We return to the question we previously engaged with – is autocracy imperative for Chinese growth? Such a question further begs an analysis of whether reformation has been completely discarded from the Chinese trajectory of socio-economic evolution, the answer to which is no. Since the era of Xiaoping’s reforms in 1978, micro-level changes have been instituted at the level of the bureaucracy through the introduction of competitive and accountability prospects. The inculcation of collective leadership along with a renewed focus on pragmatic economic growth within an atmosphere of political stability served the purpose of minimal democratization within the bureaucracy.

In the present scenario, China has engaged in the autocratisation of ideology as a means of serving the CCP’s interest. What remains to be seen is whether ideological fervor can successfully curb the assertions of political liberty in the unfolding war of ideas between liberal ideals and CCP party discipline and how this will shape the distribution of power within the regime. Only one thing can be guaranteed – the CCP will not be easily removed after nearly a century of dominating Chinese governance. 

Author’s Bio

Harshita Khaund is a Master’s student of Diplomacy, Law and Business from the Jindal School of International Affairs. She holds a bachelor’s degree in Political Science from Indraprastha College for Women, University of Delhi. Previously, she has undertaken research work at the Center for Civil Society, Project Statecraft and the Center for National Policy Research. She is keen to work in the areas of International Relations, particularly West-Asian geopolitics and global conflict and humanitarian challenges. 

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