By Dheemant Anil

Abstract

The 1962 War is often viewed as the unmitigated disaster faced by India, in its 75 Years of
history. In this article, we will analyze the Chinese strategy used in this war and try to
understand why the Chinese decided to use military force to be able to enforce their claims on
Indian territory and as such, has shaped the crisis that faces India to this day. And has brought
Asia to the brink of a new Cold War between the two Rivals.

Introduction-

India and China are two rising powers in Asia, and as such have been locked in a struggle for domination over the way Asia will go in the future, as both of them have a very frosty relationship and have been very cold in the best of the times while being on the brink of war in the worst case. China has the advantage in Material and technology, while India has been covering the distance with its increasing military strength and is preparing with the often-present refrain of the entire nation, which is “Never again 62”. This has been governing the way India thinks and the way its military leadership has been influenced by the idea that India should not and would not be caught unprepared like in the 1962 war, and would be ready to erase it with either blood or with the help of diplomacy, try and balance its northern Neighbour.

The origin of the India-China dispute on its borders starts from the era of Colonialism, in which China was ruled by the Qing and India, by the British. Both of these powers met each other on the frontiers of Tibet. This frontier was uncharted and for many of the administrators on both sides, an extremely confusing and almost enigmatic system. There was also the problem that Tibet was fiercely independent and did not take kindly to British interference in Tibet, resulting in several border skirmishes. The Qing then brought peace and agreed to meet in a summit, which would result in an agreement, however, it resulted in two different thoughts that arose for the question of the frontiers, one was the Johnson Ardagh Line, and the Macdonald Line, one of them favoring China, and the other favoring the Indians.

This dispute, however, did not get much attention as soon China started to go through a period of constant warfare and warlordism, with Tibet becoming independent in all but name, and the border became the Macdonald line agreed upon by India and Tibet. This was the border while China was fighting itself and then Japan, this frontier remained a cold one and an issue that had been decided by both governments.

All of this changed after India became independent in 1947, and the PRC (the People’s Republic of China) was formed in 1949, and after its formal annexation of Tibet in 1956 which made both parties came face to face with each other.

India, under the liberal administration of Nehru, had the view that the border dispute could be settled plainly, and could be done diplomatically, rather than with force, and this was insisted upon by the diplomats from both sides and the Panchsheel agreement was signed, which provided a 6 Point agreement and India hoped that this would allow for the dispute between the two to be solved by diplomacy.

In the PRC, there were genuine sentiments of wanting peace with India, and it was hoped that this would result in a conducive relationship for many of the veterans of the Civil War and the recent Korean War. However, all of this came down to Mao Zedong, who was the head of the CCP and therefore the de facto head of the Chinese government. He was extremely suspicious of India and saw it as a threat to his power, and wanted to remove it from power and appoint a regime that was far more susceptible to taking the Chinese side.

India was at its time stuck in what can be considered to be the personality cult of Jawahar Lal Nehru, and it was very difficult to resist the status quo. Everybody from the Military Staff of the Indian Army to the foreign services was against presenting anything that could be considered to be against the version which has been shown and presented by the Prime Minister. It was similar to going against the whim of, ironically, the Qing Emperor, who refused to hear about the defeats, and any sort of demand for the modernization of the Army was met with declining glance. This would also be proved by the decline of Nehru’s economic model which would result in  India not being able to spend much on defence.

The Indian Army was not the battle-ready force we know it to be today, it was rather limited in its number and was deeply mistrusted by the political leadership. There was a lot of favoritism, and the Army became a sort of place that reeked of inefficiency. There was also the problem that many of the political leaders saw them as a force of well-trained workers, as could be seen when the 3^rd Infantry division was transferred to Bihar to help build homes. All of this led to the collapse of the fighting efficiency of the Army, which could be seen in the Appointment of Lt General BM Kaul who, though an excellent administrator, was a poor general and as such suffered from the fright of battle and had to be removed. There are also rumors, though unproven, that the appointment of Kaul was to ensure that the Kashmiri Pandit clique continued to stay in power.

The war itself was a story of tragedy and an almost Greek-like tragedy. Indian troops fought almost to the death, against veterans of the Korean War, engaging in hand-to-hand combat and almost on empty stomachs and suffering from the inclement weather. Sometimes, they fought with dried lips and calloused hands, struggling to hold on to their position, while the nation was shocked at the fall of post after post. The end of the war itself led to a moment of shock for all the nation. The dream of an Asian power, that did not use violence and was the leader of the global south was now buried under the Himalayan snow, paid in blood, as had always been the case by the flower of Indian Youth. The Air Force was not used as it would be considered as an “Escalation”, as if Chinese boots on Indian Soil were not an escalation enough. Perhaps this was the problem that faced the Political class, as it always was, that the moral High ground seemed to be more important than the actual High ground.

But the war, instead of dividing the nation further, unified it. For many people, India became the hope to live independently. The nation was reunified and it was able to carry out several solutions, beginning with the required and needed reforms of the army which saw its modernization and transformation, which we know today. It also led to a massive-scale reform of the officer class and the way it was run. Soon these reforms led to a Hard-fought Victory in 1965, to a Total Victory in 1971.

Author’s Bio

Dheemant Anil is a student of law at the OP Jindal Global University and is an international Relations enthusiast. He is also a movie enthusiast and is interested in the history of the world and has been interested in learning about the world during the great wars and understanding why history happened the way it happened and would like to have a conversation with the history of the world and of the story of how the trade routes changed the world. 

Image Source: https://thewire.in/diplomacy/china-india-war-1962