By Dheemant Anil

Abstract

In this article, I argue that the Kashmir War of 1948 was a perfect example of how Pakistan first used nonstate actors in the form of Tribal raiders to try and balance its material and numerical deficiencies compared with India. However, it has always failed to do so, and with the problems attached to using these nonstate actors seen in the first war now coming to the fore.

The First Kashmir War, or the War of 1948, started on October 22nd, 1947. It was the first war between both India and Pakistan, which saw a large-scale deployment of infantry and airplanes from India’s side against well-armed Tribal Lashkars who were well supported by the Pakistani Army. The war ended in a frustrating stalemate that saw the division of the state as we know it today.

The Genesis of the Pakistani claim on Kashmir came from the original demand for Kashmir due to its large Muslim Population. At this point, the state of Jammu and Kashmir was a princely state ruled by a Hindu King who ruled over Kashmir with an Iron Fist. And as the British prepared to leave India, The King was faced with a dilemma. Where did the future of his dynasty lie? The Raja decided to take a third option, having convinced himself that he would be able to maintain control, as he had done, with the help of a loyal base in Jammu and with the help of the Jammu and Kashmir State Forces.

The Jammu and Kashmir State forces were a contradiction in and of themselves. It was recruited not from the state but from the Kangra Hills and the plains of Punjab, and as such, they were as foreign to the Kashmiris as the British were to Indians. The army was staffed by Officers who were recruited from the noble families in the kingdom.

The Kingdom was itself deeply divided between the Moderates led by the National Conference and a small wing that wanted integration with Pakistan. All of this meant that the Jammu and Kashmir State forces were more and more focused on internal security and were not prepared for the invasion that came, as all their forces were split in Handling the internal situations of protests and civil riots.

In 1947, Pakistani leaders were rapidly growing impatient with the Maharaja. There was a standstill agreement in place, but Jinnah was losing patience and decided that the time had come to use other methods to make the King join Pakistan. However, this was served with a large dose of reality when it saw the assets it had.

In 1947, the Pakistani Army was in no position to launch an invasion of Kashmir. There were only 30,000 Troops in its army, compared to India’s 370,000. It was outnumbered in all matters of material, and in the matter of support, it did not even have the full complement of officers needed to man an army of this size.

This is where the decision to use the tribal raiders started making sense. Unlike a conventional army, these tribals had their ammunition and arms. Recruited from the NWFP, which was an active warzone, which allowed for the large recruitment of the tribals who would be more than able to take over any political objective that the Pakistani State might set up for them. However, there were several problems attached to this. For example, there was a lack of discipline and a lack of training for these tribes and as such they were forced to be used as cannon fodder, throwing themselves into well dug-in Indian positions.

The second asset Pakistan had been the Poonchi Veterans, who were the crème de la crème of the irregular forces in the war. Many of its officers and soldiers were veterans of the Second World War, and as such, they were well organized in facing the Indian army during the siege of Poonch and the Brutal battle for the Hills of Jhangar, in which the Poonchies fought fiercely against the Indian Red Berets, who after fierce hand-to-hand fighting managed to take over the hill.

Now we need to talk about the leadership which used these soldiers, in the war, as it has been famously said, “A general is just as good or just as bad as the troops under his command make him.”, and this cannot be more proven than this war, and how the Pakistani generals conducted themselves in the war. 

There was also the problem, that the equipment that these tribes brought was their own, and this meant that Logistics regarding the ammunition were poor, to say the least, it meant that these tribesmen had to use their ammunition expeditiously as they mostly relied on looted Armouries of the J and K police and State forces. These Irregular forces were motivated by the idea of loot, which would be obtained from the cities, and as such broke apart when facing a well-motivated opponent as such this became a major problem that faced Pakistani leadership, in making decisions.

With his hands already tied by the rather loose collection and the rather confusing mix of equipment and forces he had, Major General Akbar Khan, DSO (1912–1993), who had served in the Second World War, did extremely well in trying and resisting the united command of the Indian Forces, who were led by aggressive commanders and were helped by air power. He was also not helped by the fact that many of the tribesmen were not used to the high amount of casualties given to them by the Indians and were woefully undersupplied for the task of taking a major city.

There was also the element that there was no support from the Local Kashmiri Population, who saw the tribe’s men as raiders, and the tribals made themselves no friends by incessant looting and rape, which was done in the city of Baramulla.

This is the problem faced by any user of nonstate actors. There are a variety of problems that cause many non-state actors to fail and, in several cases, cause major problems for the person who uses them. Irregular Militias are great for fighting and political warfare, but there are a variety of problems that can happen. There is no formal sense of organisation, and as Russia found out, irregular forces would not be able to hold their own when facing well-trained and well-motivated soldiers.

However, there was one front where the Pakistanis had the upper hand and which they exploited, which was in the Skardu Sector, where they used political manoeuvres and propaganda to rile up the Skardu Scouts, who were the troops recruited for the very task of fighting in the high Altitude and, as such, were able to score large-scale success in the war. However, it was all for naught as the Ibex force was defeated in a desperate battle for the Zoji La, which ended in a threat to Ladakh.

Now if one were to write a thesis on the usage of irregular forces and their pitfalls, perhaps one could cite this war as the perfect reason not to expect much of Irregular forces, as these forces have to be well-supplied and would have to be motivated and led by well-trained officers. It can work; however, there would be several factors, which would be further explained in the Article on the Bangladesh War.

This shaped how Pakistan will fight its wars in the future, with a special focus on the usage of unconventional forces who would be able to infiltrate the Indian lines and cause havoc behind the lines, while the Mechanised Fists of the Pak Army would penetrate the weakened lines and cause an encirclement, and then using this to convince Delhi to come to a negotiation table, which will be done in the terms of Pakistan and would result in a political solution to the Kashmir Problem, which will favor Pakistan.

There was also a rather racist idea that Pakistan would be able to do so, as presumably they were a martial race, and One Muslim Soldier would be able to overwhelm a weak and effeminate Hindu. A sort of “Kick the Door in, and the whole house will collapse” Sort of thinking, which was first given a bloodied nose in 1965 and was then buried in 1971 in the Warm Swamps of Bengal.

Author’s Bio

Dheemant Anil is a student of BA LLB (Hons) 2021, and is a student of History and international relations and as such writes for the Nickeled and Dimed magazine.

Image Source: https://awamiitlah.com/pakistan-india-war-of-1947-1948-aka-first-kashmir-war/