By Manya Singh

Abstract

Janet Halley’s Governance Feminism examines feminism’s paradoxical institutionalization as it transitions from radical movement to governing authority. Analyzing cases like Twyman v. Twyman, this blog reveals how feminist legal achievements risk entrenching punitive systems, marginalizing dissent, and legitimizing exclusionary power. Halley advocates a strategic pause from feminist frameworks to confront institutional complicity and rekindle transformative potential. Feminism’s survival as a radical force, she contends, depends on balancing governance with critical self-reflection to ensure institutional power advances liberation rather than replicating oppression.

Introduction

Feminism has historically been regarded as a radical force—a movement that sought to dismantle entrenched patriarchal hierarchies, reimagine social structures, and demand justice for marginalised genders. Yet, as feminist ideals have increasingly permeated legal, political, and institutional frameworks, a critical question arises: What happens when feminism is no longer solely a movement of resistance but becomes an integral part of governance itself?

Legal scholar Janet Halley’s concept of Governance Feminism invites a rigorous reassessment of feminism’s contemporary role in power structures. Through her provocative suggestion to “take a break from feminism,” Halley challenges feminism to reconcile its radical ethos with its evolving role as a governing force rather than an oppositional movement. This article examines Halley’s critique, its implications for feminist theory, and the contested future of feminism as both a liberatory project and a governing force.

The Radical Origins of Feminism

Feminism’s historical roots are undeniably radical. From the suffragettes who fought for women’s rights to vote to second-wave feminists who challenged systemic workplace discrimination, reproductive oppression, and gender-based violence, feminism positioned itself as an insurgent critique of the status quo. Early feminist movements operated from the margins, employing protest, civil disobedience, and intellectual dissent to expose injustices that had long been naturalized within patriarchal societies.

The radicalism of early feminism lay in its refusal to accept existing power structures as immutable. Feminist thinkers such as Simone de Beauvoir (The Second Sex), Audre Lorde (Sister Outsider), and Catharine MacKinnon (Toward a Feminist Theory of the State) articulated critiques that were not merely reformist but revolutionary—seeking not just inclusion in existing systems but the transformation of those systems altogether.

However, as feminist movements achieved formal legal and political victories, such as suffrage, anti-discrimination laws, and reproductive rights, feminism’s relationship to power shifted. No longer solely an oppositional force, feminism began to shape policy, law, and institutional norms. This shift raises a crucial question: Does institutionalization necessarily dilute feminism’s radical potential?

What is Governance Feminism?

Janet Halley’s conceptualization of “Governance Feminism”constitutes a significant theoretical intervention in contemporary feminist discourse, interrogating feminism’s paradoxical transition from a counter hegemonic movement to an institutionalized force embedded within structures of state and corporate power. This framework challenges triumphalist narratives of feminist progress by critically examining the implications of feminism’s ascendance to positions of governance authority.

At its core, Governance Feminism marks a historical transformation wherein feminist projects have evolved from their origins in academic critique and grassroots activism to become operationalized within formal bureaucratic, legal, and corporate apparatuses. Halley documents how feminist justice initiatives – particularly those addressing sexual harassment, pornography, and gendered violence – have migrated from protest spaces into institutional settings, manifesting in regulatory frameworks, workplace policies, judicial precedents, and legislative reforms. This institutional presence signifies a fundamental shift wherein feminism is no longer principally contesting power structures but actively exercising governance functions with tangible distributive consequences across three key domains: legal systems (e.g., sexual harassment laws, domestic violence legislation), international institutions (e.g., UN Women, CEDAW), and corporate-state policies (e.g., gender quotas, workplace equity initiatives).

A defining characteristic of Governance Feminism, in Halley’s formulation, is its inherent “will to power“, which is the explicit or implicit drive to reshape societal norms and institutions according to feminist principles. While this shift has advanced gender equity, Halley warns that such power imposes material costs, often borne by men and groups outside feminism’s ethical focus. For instance, sexual harassment policies, while vital, may redistribute social capital through reputational penalties and professional sanctions, illustrating governance’s distributive consequences.

Halley’s critique centers on what she identifies as Governance Feminism’s paradoxical “denial of power” : the rhetorical construction of feminism as perpetually marginalized despite its considerable institutional authority. This denial, which Halley characterizes as a form of bad faith, obscures the material consequences of feminist governance while reinforcing its unilateral moral authority. The structuralist tendencies within mainstream feminism, which maintain a binary model of gender subordination (male dominance/female oppression), compound this issue by rendering Governance Feminism theoretically unequipped to recognize injuries inflicted by women or upon men, or to engage substantively with competing justice claims that fall beyond its paradigmatic focus.

Moreover, Halley contends that Governance Feminism suffers from a critical absence of coherent theories of governance. Absent reflexive frameworks to navigate power responsibly, institutionalized feminism risks rigidity, accountability deficits, and marginalization of dissenting perspectives (e.g., sex-positive, queer, and postcolonial feminisms). This theoretical vacuum, paired with convergentist tendencies that homogenize feminist thought, exacerbates tensions with allied movements whose constituencies bear governance’s unintended costs.

Halley’s Reading of Twymen v Twymen 

Halley’s analysis of Twyman v. Twyman (a marital dispute involving claims of sexual coercion) serves as a microcosm of her broader argument for temporarily suspending feminist frameworks to generate alternative interpretive possibilities. By subjecting the case to multiple, competing theoretical lenses, Halley demonstrates how dominant feminist readings—particularly those structured around male dominance/female subordination (M > F)—may obscure other viable understandings of gendered power relations.

Halley first constructs a Nietzschean reading, positioning Sheila Twyman not as a straightforward victim of patriarchal oppression but as an agent of slave morality, whose claims of suffering function as instruments of moral vengeance within a broader economy of resentment. This interpretation challenges the presumption that Sheila’s legal actions reflect pure emancipatory resistance, instead suggesting they may enact a will to power through the very discourse of victimization. William’s compelled “groveling” under the weight of these claims thus becomes not merely redress for harm but a performance of moral domination.

A Foucauldian reading, by contrast, displaces the binary logic of M > F altogether, recasting the conflict as a site of diffuse, micro-political struggle. Here, both parties are constituted by intersecting discursive regimes (rape trauma theory, psychiatric pathologization of sexual “deviance,” and marital norms) that produce their subjectivities and antagonisms. Power operates not unidirectionally (from husband to wife) but as a network of reciprocal, if asymmetrical, forces. This framing deliberately decouples the case’s facts from gendered hierarchies, revealing how legal and therapeutic institutions mediate desire, injury, and retribution in ways that exceed a simple domination model.

Finally, Halley proposes a “Minimalist Feminist Reading“—one that retains gender (M/F) as an analytic category while suspending the automatic presumption of male supremacy. This approach entertains the possibility of female domination within the marriage, drawing attention to Sheila’s “astonishing powers” of legal and psychological manipulation alongside William’s abjection. Yet even this reading, Halley notes, remains haunted by normative questions: would such an inversion of gendered power ultimately serve women’s interests, or merely replicate oppressive structures in reverse?

This pluralistic exercise reveals orthodox feminism’s interpretive limits. By “taking a break” from dominant frameworks, Halley illuminates suppressed dimensions of power, urging Governance Feminism to embrace critical interruptions.

Taking a Break from Feminism: Halley’s Provocation

In her book Split Decisions: How and Why to Take a Break from Feminism, Halley makes a deliberately contentious proposal: feminists should considertemporarily stepping back from feminist frameworks to critically assess their effects.

This “break” is not a rejection of feminism but an invitation to:

• Interrogate unintended consequences (e.g., whether carceral feminist policies exacerbate mass incarceration)
• Engage with non-feminist and anti-feminist critiques (to avoid ideological insularity)
• Re-evaluate whether feminist governance reproduces new forms of domination

For example, feminist advocacy for stricter penalties against sexual violence has, in some cases, contributed to the expansion of punitive state power—a development that may disproportionately harm marginalized communities. Similarly, corporate feminism’s focus on individual empowerment (e.g., “lean in” discourse) risks depoliticizing structural inequality.

Halley’s argument is not that feminism has “failed,” but rather that uncritical adherence to feminist governance can obscure its complicities with other systems of power.

Has Feminism Lost Its Radical Edge?

The answer is contested. Radical potential persists in grassroots movements (#MeToo, reproductive justice), intersectional critiques, and transnational solidarity resisting neoliberal co-optation. Yet institutionalization risks deradicalization: mainstream NGOs prioritize incremental reform; carceral feminism aligns with punitive systems; corporate feminism obscures structural critique.

Halley contends that feminism’s radical character remains conditional, relying fundamentally on its ability to engage in sustained self-criticism. The potential hazards of Governance Feminism, which include excessive reliance on criminal justice solutions, the marginalization of dissenting perspectives, and the unexamined exercise of institutional power, collectively demonstrate why such critical reflexivity proves essential.

Conclusion

Feminism’s institutional successes remain indisputable, yet Halley’s critique reveals a fundamental paradox: as feminism becomes increasingly proximate to centers of power, it simultaneously risks distancing itself from its radical foundations. This dynamic raises not the question of whether feminism should participate in governance structures, but rather how it might do so while maintaining intellectual humility, preserving accountability to marginalized voices, and resisting the tendency toward bureaucratic ossification.

Halley’s intervention ultimately constitutes a summons to recover feminism’s radical potential through continuous reinvention. Through rigorous self-examination of its complicities and an openness to theoretical pluralism, contemporary feminism might successfully negotiate the delicate balance between institutional engagement and transformative practice. Such an approach would enable feminism to challenge not just external systems of oppression, but also the potentially corrupting influences of its own acquired power.

Author’s Bio

Manya Singh is a third-year law student currently pursuing a B.B.A. L.LB(Hons.) from O.P. Jindal Global Law School, Sonipat. Her interests lie in gender studies, intellectual property law and the intersection of law, technology, and politics.

Image Source: Feminist governance – here to stay, or gone tomorrow? – ElgarBlog